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Abstract
One objective of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) is to achieve financial services liberalization in member
countries. We assess the implications of such liberalization in the banking sectors of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. After providing an overview of the GCC
banking sector, we discuss the GATS provisions relevant to financial services and present
liberalization commitments and exemptions of these countries under the agreement.
Using the observation that spikes in oil prices are accompanied with expansion in credit
availability, we develop a simple model to formally explore the consequences of opening
up the banking sector. Our analysis considers the possible policy impact on the domestic
banking industry as well as a non-tradable sector that is driven by local entrepreneurship.
Our investigation suggests that while high oil prices facilitate credit availability, they also
enable governments to more easily and better subsidize employment in the public sector.
This more attractive outside option then serves as a deterrent to risk-taking entrepreneurs
and this could stunt the growth of the non-tradable sector. A liberalized banking sector
could mitigate this outcome as well as other institutional inefficiencies in lending, but
also brings with it the vulnerability to global financial crises. A resulting credit crunch
could then lead to retrenchment in the non-tradable sector. The situation could get
aggravated if the global financial crisis leads to a collapse in the demand for oil and
negatively affects oil prices.
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Motivation
Mature economies are characterized by a liberalized and developed private banking
system that contributes to economic growth by supporting private sector activities
through a variety of financial services and channels. Evidence from past studies on
liberalization of financial sectors confirms that there is significant increase in efficiency
and profitability of banks in developing countries with large government ownership. The
evidence, however, is mixed in terms of the expansion of credit to the private sector. This
can be a result of limited alternative financial channels or macro-microeconomic factors
that disrupt channels such as weak institutional structures, high fiscal deficits, and
external financial shocks.1
The economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries2 share similar
economic characteristics. All GCC countries are large oil exporters with vulnerabilities to
fluctuating international oil prices; and all aim to diversify their economies through
private sector growth. Given the uncertainties surrounding global economic growth, the
fiscal and external balances of oil exporting countries are vulnerable to weaker global
aggregate demand. Historically high oil prices in recent years have enabled fiscal
expansion and low interest rates to provide economic stimulus.
At the same time, however, the GCC banking sector is concentrated in a limited number
of domestic players with majority government ownership.3 Government control of banks
adds to the power the government has to set wages and prices in the public, a common
feature of natural-resource rich governments (Neary and Wijnbergen, 1985). This
highlights the importance of policies to diversify GCC economies away from natural
resources. Coupled with proper incentives and regulations, liberalization of the banking
sector can help achieve diversification by expanding credit to prospective entrepreneurs
and small or medium enterprises.
This paper adds to the literature by focusing on the liberalization of financial services in
natural resource-rich developing countries where resource revenues are, in part, used to
support a domestic financial sector. The case of GCC countries is used as illustration. The
paper argues that liberalization of the financial sector helps strengthen private sector
policy initiatives and reduce dependency on government spending. This suggests that
commitments made under the GATS should lead to a process of financial liberalization
with an aim towards economic diversification led by the private sector.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides a background on GCC
economies and the structure of the financial sector. In section 2, we provide a general and
GCC-specific discussion of the GATS and financial services. Section 3 presents our
model of services trade in the financial sector. In section 4, we discuss the results

1

See, for example, Gupta, et al. (2011).
The GCC comprises of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE).
3
See, for example, Al-Hassan, et al. (2010).
2

135

Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies
Vol. 15, No. 2, September 2013

obtained and then conclude by offering a summary and some policy recommendations in
section 5.

I. Background
The GCC has witnessed considerable economic growth over the past four decades. Much
of this growth, however, has been carried on the back of higher oil prices that began in
the seventies of the last century and continues to date. Despite the rise of non-oil GDP
over the past decade oil revenues continue to dominate national income (see figure 1).
This has widened the role of the government as the main economic agent and has
hindered policy efforts aimed at growing private sector jobs and reducing the role of the
government as the major employer.
Figure 1: GCC Countries Remain Oil Dependent

The financial sector in the GCC ranges from 8 percent of GDP in Saudi Arabia to 27
percent in Bahrain4, figures that are at par with or higher than developed economies like
the United States or the UK (see figure 2). However, the structure of the GCC’s banking
sector differs in three main aspects5:


Dominant domestic banks: In all six countries of the GCC the largest five
domestic banks account for 50 to 80 percent of the total banking sector assets.

4

The Bahraini economy has traditionally depended on the banking sector especially after the reduction of
oil revenues over the past four decades.
5
See Al-Hassan, et al. (2010).

136

Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies
Vol. 15, No. 2, September 2013



Large government ownership: Government and parastatal enterprises ownership
of banks range between 13 percent in Kuwait to over 52 percent in the UAE.



Dominance of the banking sector: The financial sector is dominated, for the most
part, by the banking sector with limited presence of non-bank financial
institutions.

Figure 2: Financial Sector in GCC is Relatively Large

II. The GATS, Financial Services, and the GCC
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was formulated to address the
growing need for an internationally recognized set of rules to regulate trade in services.
Its two main goals are to ensure transparency of rules and regulations, and promote
progressive liberalization. The second objective is advanced through improved market
access and national treatment to service suppliers. Market access and national treatment
requirements are less stringent than the demand for reciprocity that is a feature of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). While tariffs and quotas often
determine market access for goods trade, restrictions on, for example, the number of
service suppliers, the value of service transactions, or foreign capital participation, affect
market access to services. The absence of discriminatory measures, such as differential
tax treatment that puts foreign competitors at a disadvantage, is required under the
national treatment provision of the GATS. The scope of the agreement, in terms of the
sectors it covers, is broad and includes services as varied as tourism, education, and
telecommunications. Not surprisingly, financial services form the core of this list due to
their centrality in any modern economy, and because of technological change,
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deregulation, and the opening up of financial systems to international competition, all of
which have expanded trade in financial services.
The GATS recognizes services trade via four channels, which it refers to as modes. Mode
1 is cross-border trade, where services originate in one country and are consumed in
another country. Under mode 2, or consumption abroad, services are consumed by a
consumer of one country in the territory of another country. Mode 3 refers to commercial
presence of a supplier of the service in the territory of another country. Finally, mode 4,
or presence of natural persons, covers labor movement from one country to deliver
services in another country. All four modes are clearly relevant to the provision of
financial services with mode 3 having particular significance since it directly addresses
the physical presence of foreign financial institutions, such as banks, in another country.
In fact, recent GATS negotiations have been characterized by attempts to seek ambitious
commitments on the supply of financial services through commercial presence abroad.
For designated service sectors, each member country is required to specify its
commitments relating to market access and national treatment under each of the four
modes of supply. The so-called Schedule of Commitments therefore contains eight
entries per sector, listing any limitations on market access or national treatment under
each of the four modes of services supply identified by the GATS.
Financial services are critical to the growth prospects of any economy (Levine, 1997). As
the GCC region continues to grow and structural reforms are implemented, demand for
financial services has increased in tandem. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005) identify profit
opportunities, integration between home and host markets, and institutional and
regulatory frameworks as the most important determinants of global bank expansion. The
GCC has made consistent progress on all these fronts. However, these countries have had
to contend with legitimate concerns over the liberalization of the financial services sector,
including (1) the uncertainty surrounding the impact of opening up on the financial
sector, (2) the prospects of the domestic financial industry to prosper, and, (3) crucially,
the effect on the rest of the economy. Liberalization under the GATS tends to reduce
adverse selection and moral hazard problems since better project management and
assessment expertise benefits from local knowledge and reduces nepotism- and
reputation-based lending. Foreign competition also promotes the wider use of auditing
and accounting procedures and establishes more transparency. Since foreign financial
services providers tend to have a comparative advantage—due often to tax and regulatory
distortions, but also because of underdeveloped financial sectors in developing
countries—it behooves economies such as the group of GCC countries to undertake
liberalization. Apart from the static benefits of liberalization in the form of lower prices,
there are dynamic benefits manifested in enhanced growth prospects.
Quantifying liberalization commitments under the GATS is an inherently subjective
exercise. Country commitments are publicly available from the services database of the
WTO. Following Harm, et al (2003), we construct an index and assign a value of 0 to
“unbound” entries (implying no commitments) under market access and national
treatment for each of the four modes in a country’s GATS schedule. We enter a value of
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1 if the schedule reports “none” reflecting unrestricted commitments. For modes 1, 2 and
4, a value of 0.5 was assigned for the cases of intermediate-level commitments due to the
uncertain economic significance of these modes. However, since mode 3 is particularly
important in the case of financial services, we employ a more varied approach and assign
a value of 0.25 if the limitation is on licensing of new entry, 0.5 if foreign equity is
limited to less than 50 percent, and 0.75 otherwise. The process is carried out for the
banking and insurance sectors. Note that no limitations (the most open regime) under any
mode and under market access and national treatment would correspond to an index
value of 8. The most restrictive regime would be associated with an index value of 0.
The results are reported in Tables 1 and 2a-b below. So, for example, since the GATS
commitments schedule for Bahrain for the insurance sector shows unrestricted
commitments under modes 1 through 3 in both market access and national treatment, but
no commitments under mode 4, the index value turns out to equal 6. Similarly, for the
banking sector (we restrict our attention to lending and deposit operations only), the
index value of 3.5 is obtained for both deposits and lending. Kuwait and the UAE do not
have any commitments for insurance services in the GATS schedule and are therefore not
numerically recorded in Table 1.
Table 1: Index of GATS Commitments in (Direct) Insurance Services

The information in the tables shows that the GCC countries maintain a considerably
liberalized regime as far as national treatment is concerned. However, policy
commitments toward the provision of market access displays more nuance. While
consumption of financial services abroad by GCC consumers is free of restrictions, crossborder trade (mode 1) and commercial presence (mode 3) have more limitations. In
banking, for example, GCC members other than Qatar and the UAE retain the right to
impose restrictive measures on mode 1 trade. This could be a reflection of concerns over
consumer protection, capital transfers, and regulation of suppliers that lack a solid
reputation. Insurance services under mode 1 fare better probably because these services
are highly internationalized and less risky to regulate. Mode 3, which is highly important
for financial services, is the least open channel across the GCC, with every member
listing limited commitments. Not unexpectedly, mode 4, which covers foreign labor
139

Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies
Vol. 15, No. 2, September 2013

flowing in to deliver services, remains the most tightly controlled channel across all
countries of the GCC under both market access and national treatment.
Table 2a: Index of GATS Commitments in Banking Services - Deposit

Table2b: Index of GATS Commitments in Banking Services - Lending

Overall, the countries of the GCC, at best, display only moderate commitments to
financial openness, particularly in banking. Protection of the sector and the consequent
lack of competition are further evidenced by the difference in the lending and deposit
rates in the GCC. Information on these rates is presented in Table 3 below.
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Table 3: Lending-Deposit Interest Rate Differentials

Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF data.

There is a healthy gap between lending and deposit rates in the GCC. In Norway, Japan,
and the Bahamas, the average interest rate spread over the same period was under two
percent. In Canada and Israel, it was just over two percent.
The next section presents our model of financial services liberalization and its impact on
the relative sizes of the public and private sectors.

III. The Model
We have N agents in the economy. Each agent can either become an entrepreneur to
produce a non-tradable good Z in the private sector, or find employment in the public
sector. The agent maximizes profits, which he gets to keep, in the private sector or
receives a fixed income  y in the public sector. Inefficiency or corruption in the public
sector means that only a portion of each dollar the government puts in the public sector
makes it into the hands of the agent with  being a measure of this inefficiency and
0<  <1. A higher value of  implies a more efficient public sector or lower corruption.
The non-tradable good Z is produced using only financial (banking) services with the
production function given by:
Z  sa

where s is the amount of banking services used in production and a is a parameter such
that 0  a  1 . The price of a unit of banking services is p. However, we assume that due
to information and other financial sector inefficiencies, the agent faces an additional cost
of c( ) per unit of financial services, where θ denotes the extent of financial services
liberalization chosen by the government, with 0 < θ < 1. The additional cost may also be
depicted in the interest rate spread. Hence, the agent takes θ as given. A higher value of θ
implies a more closed sector. We assume that the introduction of foreign banks into the
domestic financial sector reduces inefficiencies in this sector due to the superior business
practices these banks bring with them. The process of financial intermediation is likely to
improve with the importation of better know-how and lending practices and procedures.
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This implies that c( ) increases in θ and captures the foreign comparative advantage in
the provision of financial services. The agent’s profit maximization problem can then be
written as:

Max   s a  ( p  c( ))s
s

The demand for banking services is therefore:
1

1
 a1
s   ( p  c( ))
a


(1)

Note that the price of financial services is less than their marginal product due to
inefficiencies in the sector. Also note that this price approaches the marginal product of
banking services as θ goes to zero, i.e., as the financial services sector is liberalized.
Given the two options, public and private, to generate income, each agent solves:

Y  max{ y,  }
Agents will be found in both the public and the private sectors if  y   ( p; ) .
Otherwise, all agents will be in the sector that offers a higher return. The equality
condition above holds for a unique price p given θ and can be written as:

p  s a 1  c( ) 

y
s

.

(2)

This price is lower for lower levels of banking services productivity since demand for
services would suffer in that case. High inefficiency in the public sector would also
reduce p .
The domestic supply of banking services depends on how much of its own revenue the
government decides to convert to banking services. This domestic supply is enhanced by
foreign banks if the financial sector is liberalized. Specifically, the supply of banking
services is given by:
S   (1   ) F  B .

(3)

Here, S is the total supply of banking services, B is the domestic supply created by the
government, and F is contributed by foreign banks. The parameter δ summarizes the
instability of the part of the financial sector that does not depend on government support.
Alternatively, it could also be thought of as a parameter for the extent to which a global
financial crisis impacts the ability of banks to provide services in the domestic market.
Hence, δ can be the probability of not experiencing a global financial crisis, in which case
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foreign banks provide F units of banking services while no banking services are
generated from abroad if a financial crisis is realized. A low value of δ implies a severe
contraction in banking services provision.
We can determine the equilibrium price of banking services by setting the supply in (3)
equal to the demand for financial services in (1). Since (1) is the demand for financial
services by a single agent, we multiply it by the number of agents in the banking sector to
obtain market demand. The equilibrium price is then:
 B   (1   ) F 
p  a

Nz



a 1

*

 c( ) ,

(4)

where N z is the number of agents in the private sector. If p *  p , then  y   ( p * ; ) ,
and agents move into the public sector. This causes a contraction in the private sector and
decreases N z , reducing p * as a result. The drop in p * continues until  y   ( p * ; ) . A
similar process occurs in the opposite direction for p *  p .
The economy is rich in a natural resource, such as oil, that is sold on global markets.
These sales are the only source of government revenue. We assume relative inelasticity in
global supply for the natural resource so that changes in its price and government revenue
move in the same direction.6 Government revenue is denoted by R, which the government
than spends on supporting the public sector, creating banking services for the private
sector, and its own utility-generating consumption. Banking services are created using a
simple linear technology—a unit of banking services is created by each dollar the
government decides to spend on it. All things equal, we would expect higher natural
resource revenues to lead to more banking services being created by the government. The
government’s revenue constraint can then be written as:
G  (N  N z ) y  B  R ,

(5)

where G is government consumption and N is the size of the labor force. The government
maximizes the sum of the returns to all agents and its own utility, G  , 0    1:

Max N z  ( p; )  ( N  N z ) y  G  subject to (5).

 , y , B ,G

The first order conditions establish that:
1

1
N   1
G
 ,
 ( N  N z ) 

(6)

6

Van Robays (2012) demonstrates that both oil supply and demand are likely to be more inelastic in times
of high macroeconomic uncertainty.
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which suggests that increasing government consumption reduces the relative size of the
private sector. This reduction is less significant if public-sector inefficiencies are
substantial, i.e., φ is low. For a given level of government consumption, we would expect
to see a larger public sector in countries with lower levels of inefficiency or corruption in
that sector.
Revenue that the government does not consume itself is spent on creating banking
services and supporting the public sector. The optimal division of funds between banking
and the public sector requires that the marginal returns of the last dollar spent in each
sector be equal. Therefore,

(1  a)as 1 /( a2) B   (1   ) F  

N
.
(7)
( N  N z ) 2 a
Condition (7) confirms the intuition that the relative size of the private sector shrinks
when:
a) the financial sector is more unstable (or the impact of a crisis on the ability of
banks to provide services is high, or the probability of a financial crisis is high7),
b) the government reduces its contribution to creating banking services,
c) the government increases financial sector protection.

IV. Discussion and Results
The implications of the model can be compared to relevant GCC data. Figure 3 below
supports our assumption that the supply of financial services is likely to be higher when
oil prices trend up8.
Figure 3: Oil Prices and Private Sector Credit Growth in the GCC

7

This is a forward-looking interpretation of the model.
Note that the decline of credit growth in 2006 depicted in Figure 3 is a direct result of the stock market
plunge across GCC countries.
8
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One of the implications of our model is that higher banking services provision by the
government is associated with a smaller public sector. The information contained in
Tables 4 and 5 provide support for this prediction. For example, Table 4 shows only 3.7
percent of the banks in Qatar are foreign. The corresponding number for Saudi Arabia is
13 percent. This is opposed to figures of 37.8 percent in Bahrain. Table 5 reports the
proportion of public sector employment in total employment in these countries and shows
that public employment is higher in Qatar and Saudi Arabia and significantly lower in
Bahrain. Public employment in Kuwait, where no banks had foreign ownership, is also
nearly as high as it is in Qatar. Our model suggests the same link. Table 5 also displays
the Heritage Foundation index on the lack of corruption.
Table 4: Ownership Structure of the Domestic Banking System in Percent of Total Assets (2007)

Source: Al-Hassan, et al (2010)

Lower corruption levels (a higher index) appear to be roughly associated with higher
levels of public sector employment. The model argues that a more efficient government
sector ensures a greater portion of each dollar the government directs toward publicsector employees reaches the employees’ pockets and is therefore more effective at
raising welfare. A government concerned about welfare in the public sector would be
expected to support a larger sector. A notable exception to the trend apparent in Table 5
is Qatar, which has the highest level of public sector employment despite also being on
top in terms of the freedom from corruption9.

9

Though evidence is ambiguous, this may be a result of having small populations which are likely to be
associated with lower corruption levels especially given a significant and educated expatriate labor force in
the government sector.
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Table 5: Corruption and Public Employment

Source: Heritage Corruption Index and government data, 2008.

Our model points toward a positive relationship between financial sector stability and the
size of the private sector. This is equivalent to claiming a negative relationship between
financial stability and the size of the public sector. Financial stability can be thought of to
have two components—external and internal.
The level of external financing is an attractive candidate to proxy for the external level of
financial sector vulnerability—high levels of external financing could be taken as an
indication of market perception of financial stability. Figure 4 graphs the change in
external financing in the six member countries of the GCC. External financing increased
rapidly from 2003 to 2009, reaching $103 billion in 2008, but then collapsing with the
advent of the global financial crisis. Based on this measure, the financial sector in
Bahrain appears most stable while Oman is at the bottom of the list. Our model predicts
the highest relative private sector employment in Bahrain and the data lends to support to
that conclusion. Although we could not compare model predictions to the case of Oman
due to a lack of data, we can evaluate them for Kuwait and Qatar. The levels of external
financing in these two countries are only higher than Oman’s. The levels of public
employment in Kuwait and Qatar, on the other hand, put these countries at the top of the
table, confirming the implication of our model that higher levels of public employment
are likely to be observed in countries with less sound financial sectors. Saudi Arabia, with
a substantial level of issuances also has one of the bigger public sectors in the GCC and
does not conform to our model. Qatar is the only country for which data on the relative
size of the public sector was available beyond 2008. In 2009, 87 percent of all workers in
Qatar belonged to the public sector. Although this is a very small drop from its 2008
level, the trend does follow the prediction of our model since, unlike other GCC
countries, Qatar also experienced continued growth in external financing even after its
collapse in other countries and regions.
It is interesting to note that Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait exhibit the least
diversification among the GCC. This could be an indication of a complementary factor
promoting a larger private-sector role in countries with a higher diversification ranking
(Figure 5). The lack of diversification could be overwhelming the vote of confidence in
Saudi banks implied by the high level of external financing in making Saudi Arabia, the
largest economy in the GCC, buck the trend suggested by our model.
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Figure 4: Banks’ External Financing (in billions of US dollars)

Source: Al-Hassan, et al. (2010)
Figure 5: GCC Economies Need More Diversification

A robust financial sector is essential for a diversified economy capable of exporting
goods and services other than natural resources (Kletzer and Bardhan, 1987; Beck, 2002).
Diversification needs to be supported by a banking sector not dependent on government
support since various projections for the oil price suggest that the GCC is likely to lose
crucial fiscal space in the coming years. For example, oil prices are expected to dip below
$100 by 2015. According to the World Economic Outlook, with current levels of
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government spending, GCC fiscal surpluses are projected to turn into fiscal deficits by
2017.
Internal stability of the financial sector is manifested in banking data such as capital-asset
ratios, the proportion of non-performing loans, and profitability. Based on these criteria,
GCC banks seem to support the notion that the financial sector is quite stable with
impressive rates of capitalization and profitability (Table 6). However, given the active
role that GCC governments play in supporting the banking sector—not surprisingly, solid
bank performance has dovetailed high oil prices—these numbers do not necessarily
indicate the sector’s maturity. Although variation across countries in these numbers is
limited, countries whose construction and real estate sectors were hit particularly hard by
the financial crisis, have slightly more distressing levels (for example, on provisions to
NPLs). Even though concerns have been raised in the past about the readiness for
liberalization of the financial sector (for example, Wahba and Mohieldin, 1998), Table 6
suggests that the time to expand the level of openness may have arrived.
At first glance, Figure 6 does not imply a concrete relationship between financial sector
liberalization and the size of the public sector. However, if we disregard the set of
observations on the extreme right—these are the points depicting Qatar10—the remaining
points, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, indicate a roughly negative
relationship between public employment and openness. This is in line with the prediction
of our model that financial sector openness is likely to increase private sector
employment by increasing the supply of financial services. The figure shows public
sector employment levels for 2006 and 2008. Note that public sector employment is at
least slightly higher in 2006 than in 2008 for all pairs of data. The drop in public sector
employment is a further affirmation of our model since the continued growth in private
sector credit until 2008 is in line with the expansion of the private sector.
Table 6: GCC Financial Soundness Indicators

10

The significantly high level of public sector employment in Qatar is driven in large part by the presence
of an unusually high number of foreign workers in the public sector, and this could be the reason for Qatar
being an outlier in Figure 6.
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Table 6: GCC Financial Soundness Indicators (continued)

Source: Al-Hassan, et al. (2010)

Figure 6: Financial Sector Openness and Public Employment

Source: Authors calculations and various government publications

V. Conclusion
Countries of the GCC have largely weathered the storm of the global financial crisis
better than most other regions of the world. While exposure to global markets is not
trivial, it remains relatively lower than in many developing countries. Historically high
oil prices have helped put economic growth on a firmer footing, although growth has not
necessarily been inclusive (Arezki and Nabli, 2012). This provides policymakers with an
unparalleled opportunity to unequivocally put the GCC on the path to robust and viable
growth characterized by diversified economies that are led by the private sector. Salehi149
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Esfahani and Squire (2007) have pointed out that countries of the Middle East and North
Africa have, in the past, been able to maintain trade openness during periods of high oil
prices. For the private sector in these countries to continue to compete in a globalized
economy, even when oil prices trend downward, the financial sector needs to play a
leading role in promoting private-sector led growth and reducing over-dependence on the
oil sector.
The GCC banking sector exhibits considerable government ownership and limited
openness to foreign banking services. With government spending linked to rising oil
prices, this structure has not affected the stability or profitability of the banking sector.
Indeed, in the wake of the global financial crisis, the banking sectors in countries like
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait managed to weather the world’s financial storm. This,
however, also points to the fact that such countries exhibit less private sector activities
than generally perceived or indicated by the data. In fact private sector activities in
several sectors such as construction, which depend on banking services for funding, are a
direct result of government spending. In terms of profitability measures, therefore, this
means a high degree of stability for countries where governments play a larger role in the
economy. Despite this, however, the GCC countries—with varying degrees—remain the
least diversified among high income economies reflecting the lack of opportunities of the
private sector to grow and expand its economic base.
Our model shows that as government consumption increases the relative size of the
private sector declines. This is also aided by increases in public corruption or less
efficient government operations. An important policy implication for the GCC, therefore,
is enhanced governance of public institutions and introduction of higher level of
competition in banking services in order to increase private sector activities and promote
a more diversified economy. These steps are essential to reduce vulnerabilities and ensure
long term growth.
Our model also demonstrates the link between financial sector openness, the sector’s
subsidization, and government support of public sector employment. Future research
could explore the role of political economy considerations in determining the level of
GATS commitments in the financial sector, the extent of public sector jobs subsidization,
the share of the non-tradable sector in national income, and the existence, or lack thereof,
of entrepreneurial activity in the economy. This approach is likely to uncover deeper
connections between these variables by focusing on the unique structural characteristics
of the GCC economies. Another important avenue to explore is dynamic effects in an
economy characterized by our model. A dynamic approach is likely to shed light on the
longer term impact on policy of oil price volatility, likelihood of global crises, and
possible compromises in WTO negotiations.
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